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During the last few decades, economists have become interested in the wine industry and several 
of them have focused on the determinants of price. One characteristic that has been identified as 
an important determinant is expert wine ratings. Much of the previous research on this topic has 
focused on relating expert grades to the retail price of wine. Using proprietary data, this paper 
will test whether these grades influence retail prices as well as retailer profits and wholesale 
pricing. By analyzing an individual wholesale firm in South Florida and their distribution net-
work, this paper determines the effect expert ratings have on these dependent variables.  
Empirical evidence confirms that expert ratings have a positive effect on wholesale and 
retail wine prices and that they exhibit a parallel influence on retailer profits. This thesis aims to 
contribute new information to aid both the end consumers purchasing decisions as well as busi-







I express sincere thanks and gratitude to my thesis chair Dr. Michael R. Caputo for his involve-
ment in this project. His dedication, guidance, wisdom, and love for wine have truly shaped this 
thesis. Much appreciation also goes to the countless digressed conversations that took place in 
his office which molded my undergraduate curriculum and prepared me for graduate school, all 
while maintaining an air of humor. 
 
I extend a special thanks to my other committee members, Dr. David O. Scrogin, and Dr. John F. 
Schell, for their direction and insight.  
 
I would also like to convey my gratitude to Mitchell Froelich for his inspiration, comments, and 
countless discussions regarding this thesis. And lastly, to the unknown wholesaler, without 
whom this thesis would have never existed. 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1 
Background Information ............................................................................................................................ 4 
Wine Advocate Grades ............................................................................................................................. 4 
Wine Spectator Grades .............................................................................................................................. 5 
The Hedonic Method .................................................................................................................................. 7 
Review of Literature ................................................................................................................................... 9 
Data ............................................................................................................................................................ 13 
Variable Selection ................................................................................................................................... 13 
Issues with Data Collection and Organization ........................................................................................ 13 
Data ......................................................................................................................................................... 15 
Econometric Models  ................................................................................................................................ 17 
Functional Form ...................................................................................................................................... 17 
Hedonic Regressions ............................................................................................................................... 17 
Results  ....................................................................................................................................................... 24 
Hedonic Regression on Retail Price ........................................................................................................ 24 
Hedonic Regression on Wholesale Price ................................................................................................ 26 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................ 28 
Appendix: Linear-Log and Log-Log Results .......................................................................................... 30 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 – Taxonomy of Wine Advocate Scores ......................................................................................... 5 
Table 2 – Taxonomy of Wine Spectator Scores ......................................................................................... 6 
Table 3 – Overview of Characteristics and Dummy Variable .............................................................. 16 
Table 4 – Hedonic Regression Analysis on Retail Price ........................................................................ 20 
Table 5 – Hedonic Regression Analysis on Wholesale Price ................................................................. 22 




Wine has been in existence for millennia, originating in Eastern Europe,
1
 and appearing in Amer-
ica in the 1500’s (Stevenson, 1997). Over the years, wine production has been transformed into a 
sophisticated art form. And like any fine piece of art, there are critics and experts that judge and 
rate its quality. One expert in particular has rocked the foundation of modern wine making and 
exerted great influence on wine consumption. American wine critic Robert Parker arrived on the 
wine scene in the 1970’s and has since become a leading influence on wine markets in several 
countries. Even in more established wine regions, such as France, his opinion has become de 
rigueur. Today, he is arguably the most influential wine critic in the world. His tasting notes and 
ratings are published in Wine Advocate, a magazine founded on unbiased reporting. Given that 
his reputation, pallet, and nose have apparently become so influential within the wine communi-
ty, a natural question arises regarding whether his ratings affect wine prices. More specifically, 
and of particular interest to this paper, is whether or not his ratings affect retailer profits and 
wholesale prices.  
Although former research shows Parker has exhibited influence on the market in past 
years, this may not be the case today. His influence may be dampened by the evolution of Wine 
Advocate. Robert Parker was a one-man show until 1996 when Pierre Rovani became the second 
critic to join Wine Advocate. Since that time, nine wine critics have joined and eight are currently 
reviewing wines for the magazine in addition to Parker (Parker, 2001). This brings about a ques-
tion: is the “Parker Effect,” as determined by Ali et al. (2007), still the “Parker effect,” or is it 
                                                          
1
 The exact location of the origin of wine is a debated topic. “In his book Ancient Wine: The Search for the Origins 
of Viniculture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), McGovern proposes modern-day Georgia and Armenia 
as the likely sites of the domestication of the Eurasian wine grape some 8,000 years ago.” (Harrington 2004)  
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now the “Parker, Galloni, MacNeil, Martin, Miller, Perrotti-Brown, Schildknecht, Squires, Zraly 
Effect”? Either consumers accept the new members on Parker’s team to be representative of Par-
ker himself, or the effect Parker has on the market is no longer as substantial as it once was. Be-
cause this may be the case, it is of merit to include expert ratings from another source to see 
Wine Advocates influence in comparison with its peers.  
Wine Spectator is another periodical that publishes expert wine ratings and may have an 
even greater influence on how wine prices are set than Wine Advocate. Wine Spectator was 
founded in 1976 and has since generated a large following. The magazine consists of six senior 
tasters and four additional tasting members, each having expertise in a specific wine region. Ac-
cording to senior and managing editor of Wine Spectator, Dana Nigro, “[the] magazine now 
reaches more than 2.58 million readers” and is the most widely read wine magazine in the world. 
As of 2010 Wine Spectator has 401,000 paid subscribers, dwarfing Wine Advocates nearly 
50,000. This being the case, it would be reasonable to assume that Wine Spectator may have a 
more substantial influence on the setting of wine prices than Wine Advocate.  
Florida beverage law states that there cannot be a direct relationship between producers 
and retailers, instead wine must be sold through an intermediary. This three-tier system adds an-
other degree of pricing, wholesale pricing, that will be addressed in this paper. The goal of this 
research is to measure the marginal impact each wine characteristic has on the setting of whole-
sale prices, retail prices and retailer profits. To do so, data on the wholesale costs and retail pric-
es of bottles of wine that differ in a large number of observable characteristics was collected. The 
information on these wines was used to obtain a comprehensive analysis of the influence, if any, 
of expert ratings on wine prices, and which publication, if any, has a greater influence. It will al-
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so report any interesting or unexpected results regarding attributes and their effects on the three 
dependent variables being tested. This paper will focus only on wines sold in Florida. 
The paper proceeds as follows: first, a detailed explanation is provided on the expert rat-
ings analyzed in this paper. Then, the hedonic price method is described and followed up by pre-
vious related literature. Data collection and organization is discussed before the econometric 
models are presented. The hedonic regression equations are calculated and finally, the results and 





Wine Advocate Grades 
 
In order to fully comprehend this research, it is important to understand the data to be investigat-
ed, the first being Wine Advocate scores. Wine Advocate uses a 50 to 100 point system to score 
wines. The tastings are conducted under peer-group blind conditions, meaning the same varietals 
of wines are tasted without knowing the identity of the producer. There are a few exceptions to 
this rule with regard to barrel tastings, specific appellation tastings (in which producers do not 
submit samples for group tastings), and for all wines priced below $25.00. The score given to the 
wine is representative of what Wine Advocate thinks of the wine “vis-à-vis its peer group” (Par-
ker, n.d.). Many wines may be reviewed more than once, in which case the score given to the in-
dividual bottle of wine signifies the average of the wines performance to date. Wine Advocate 
ratings focus on color, aroma and bouquet, flavor and finish, and overall quality or aging poten-














Table 1 – Taxonomy of Wine Advocate Scores 
Score Explanation 
90 – 100 Is equivalent to an A and is given only for an outstanding or special effort. Wines in 
this category are the very best produced of their type. There is a big difference be-
tween a 90 and 99, but both are top marks.  
80 – 89 Is equivalent to a B in school and such a wine, particularly in the 85-89 range, is 
very, very good; many of the wines that fall into this range often are great values as 
well. 
70 – 79 Represents a C, or average mark, but obviously 79 is a much more desirable score 
than 70. Wines that receive scores between 75 and 79 are generally pleasant, 
straightforward wines that lack complexity, character, or depth. If inexpensive, they 
may be ideal for uncritical quaffing. 
Below 70 Is a D or F, depending on where you went to school. For wine, it is a sign of an im-
balanced, flawed, or terribly dull or diluted product that will be of little interest to 
the discriminating consumer. 
Source: Parker, R. (n.d.). The wine advocate rating system. Retrieved from http://www.erobertparker.com 
/info/legend.asp 
 
Wine Spectator Grades 
 
Wine Spectator also uses a 50 to 100 point scale. Its critics taste in excess of 15,000 wines per 
year and seem to be more systematic in their approach than those in Wine Advocate. They con-
duct blind tastings and have similar exceptions as Wine Advocate, including barrel and unofficial 
tastings,
2
 but all tastings are held in private rooms and the reviewers follow a strict process for 
each one. Tastings are conducted on similar wines grouped by varietal, appellation, or region, 
each of which are known by the taster, but the identity of the producer, wine, and prices are con-
cealed. They begin with a non-blind tasting of a previously rated wine for a reference point. Dur-
ing tastings, other previously rated wines are presented with the new wines in order to ensure 
consistency. All wines are covered with a bag and numbered. Critics enter their review notes and 
their ratings before the bag is removed. Once the bag is removed, additional information may be 
entered into the tasting notes, but the rating is never altered. Critics taste corked, flawed, and 
                                                          
2
 Unofficial tastings are those in which the editors taste wines in non-blind, unofficial settings from their cellars or in 
restaurants. These tastings are denoted as such.  
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high scoring wines again to confirm their evaluations. Wine Spectators ratings are based on po-
tential quality, which they define as “how good the wines will be when they are at their peak.” 
Table 2 presents Wine Spectators explanation for each grade range.  
Table 2 – Taxonomy of Wine Spectator Scores 
Score Explanation 
95 – 100 Classic: a great wine 
90 – 94 Outstanding: a wine of superior character and style 
85 – 89 Very good: a wine with special qualities 
80 - 84 Good: a solid, well-made wine 
75 - 79 Mediocre: a drinkable wine that may have minor flaws 
50 - 74 Not recommended 
Source: Wine spectator's 100-point scale. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.winespectator.com/wso_dev. 
php/display/show/id/scoring-scale. 
 
Although Wine Advocate and Wine Spectator do not comprise the entire critic pool (oth-
ers exist, including Decanter Magazine and International Wine Cellar), they will be the focus of 
this paper. Both quality ratings will be present in the hedonic regression equation, in addition to 




THE HEDONIC METHOD 
Before presenting the literature review, let me provide a brief exposition of the hedonic method 
for informational purposes.  
Many goods are heterogeneous in nature. While they may be similar in that they are sold 
in the same market, they may also be distinct because of their differing characteristics. The dif-
ferent characteristics in products are often reflected in the different prices assigned to those 
products in their markets. However, the explicit price of each characteristic is typically not ob-
servable. If there existed only one differing characteristic, it would be fairly easy to assign an 
implicit price to it. Taylor (2003) used an example of two houses situated on two different lakes, 
ceteris paribus, to explain the underlying theory of the hedonic method and how one arrives at 
the implicit prices. Both homes have an initial equilibrium price of $200,000. Now, imagine that 
Lake A has higher water clarity than Lake B. At $200,000, assuming people prefer higher water 
clarity, there would be an excess demand for homes on Lake A, putting upward pressure on the 
price in order to return to equilibrium. The home on Lake A sells at, for example, $210,000 in 
the new equilibrium. In this case, the implicit price of higher water clarity is $10,000.  
However, most markets are not this simple, and reasonable consumers take into consider-
ation an array of factors when deciding to purchase a home, such as location, school zones, and 
crime rates. Fortunately, the hedonic method can be applied to both simple and more complex 
situations.  
By observing consumer purchasing decisions on heterogeneous products within the same 
market, one can estimate the implicit prices, or hedonic prices, associated with each characteris-
tic. In principle, this information makes it possible to determine underlying consumer prefer-
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ences for individual characteristics and the willingness to pay for a marginal unit of the charac-
teristic (Taylor 2003). In short, the hedonic method is a statistical approach used to explain the 
marginal effects of individual characteristics on the dependent variable. The hedonic method has 
been used by several other economists and the following papers show that the approach is ubiq-




REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Rosen (1974) laid the foundation for the hedonic price method in his pure competition model for 
product differentiation. Rosen’s (1974) model established a competitive equilibrium by assigning 
prices and values to characteristics of the good, determining consumption and production deci-
sions, and then equating those decisions. When the buyers’ and sellers’ decisions “intersect,” the 
price buyers are willing to pay for a set of characteristics equals the amount sellers are willing to 
accept. In Rosen’s (1974) model, substitution is assumed to be absent, producers are assumed to 
be profit maximizers, consumers are assumed to be budget-constrained utility maximizers, and 
factor prices are assumed to differ among firms. In its basic form, Rosen’s (1974) hedonic meth-
od is essentially “a regression model that links a good’s price, the dependent variable, with its 
various attributes, the independent variables” (Nordman & Wagner, 2009). This paper will em-
ploy this hedonic price regression.  
Oczkowski (1994) estimated marginal values for individual characteristics of Australian 
premier table wine with the hedonic price method. He employed the linear and log-linear regres-
sions on his dependent variable, recommended retail prices. He excludes technical attributes, 
such as sugar and acid levels, from his regression under the supposition that these characteristics 
are unimportant to the end consumer and cannot significantly affect wine prices on the demand 
side of the market. He concluded that six characteristics, namely, quality, cellaring potential, 
grape variety/style, grape region, grape vintage, and producer size were statistically significant 
determinants of retail wine prices. Oczkowski (1994) used interaction terms in his analysis, how-
ever, this paper will not, mainly because the number of observations is low and the number of 
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independent variables is high. This paper employs the linear and log-linear models, but does not 
use the exact same set of independent variables. 
Parker and Zilberman (1993) employed the hedonic method in their analysis of the Cali-
fornia fresh peach industry by taking into consideration peach quality at the producer and retail 
levels. They controlled for factors such as spoilage and seasonal limitations, and focused on 
marketing costs and the marketing margin, defined by producer costs and retailer margins, re-
spectively. They concluded that margins decline as the season progresses and increase with qual-
ity characteristics. The time component present in Parker and Zilberman’s (1993) regression is 
an important variable considering fruit show signs of spoilage throughout the season which in 
turn affect its quality and price. This paper can be compared to Parker and Zilberman’s (1993) 
regression in that wine prices are a function of quality ratings and other characteristics.  
Hadj Ali et al. (2007) examined the impact of Parker’s oenological grades on Bordeaux 
en primeur wine prices. The authors focused on “price when wine is graded minus price in the 
absence of grading.” One year, Parker was late in his tastings, and producers were forced to price 
their wines before his rating was assigned. A small but negative effect was exhibited on the 
wines that did not have the rating, in comparison to the wines that were rated before the prices 
were released in other years. They estimated a “Parker Effect” and found a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between Parker grades and prices. The authors determined that the impact of 
Parker is important for high quality wines but vanish for low quality wines, without turning 
negative. Because a positive relationship exists between Parker’s ratings and price, it may also be 
true that one exists with retailer profits and wholesale price as well, but information on costs 
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need to be analyzed. This paper also considers the ratings of Wine Spectator, which are thought 
to have a positive relationship with price as well. 
Lecocq and Visser’s (2006) primary objective was to determine whether sensory or ob-
jective characteristics influence the price of Bordeaux and Burgundy wines. They concluded 
through hedonic price estimates that the prices of Bordeaux and Burgundy wines are largely de-
termined by objective characteristics that people can easily observe, such as vintage. They con-
cluded that their jury grades,
3
 which are considered sensory in nature, have a positive and signif-
icant effect on prices as well, but are less important than objective attributes in determining 
price. This paper will also examine the effect that sensory and objective characteristics have on 
price as well as profit margins. 
Costanigro et al. (2007) proposed that different hedonic functions should be used for each 
classification or market segment of wine (they used the example of red and white classifications, 
but notice that other segmentations exist). The authors argued that different functions should be 
used in order to prevent model specification issues and reduce sample heterogeneity. They note 
that by estimating separate hedonic functions, the sum of the squared errors is significantly re-
duced and the resulting estimates are more defensible and informative. This paper will not esti-
mate separate hedonic functions for each market segment primarily because the number of ob-
servations is too small. 
                                                          
3
 The jury grades used by Lecocq and Visser are not those of well known wine critics (such as Wine Advocate or 
Wine Spectator). They performed their own tasting in which the wines were bought anonymously from the produc-
ers. The samples were randomly selected and were tasted by 4 or 5 independent wine experts (unspecified). Each ju-
ry member would write comments concerning olfactory and gustatory findings and general comments on alcohol 




Additionally, it is not exactly clear which segmentation is best to use, resulting in several 
possible regression equations. An example of one classification that could segment the variables 
in this data set includes on- and off-premise wines, the distinction being those institutions in 
which you can consume alcoholic beverages in the facility versus those in which you cannot, re-
spectively. This data set also includes red and white wines, still and sparkling wines, and other 
variables that could be divided into market segments. Although Costanigro (2007) would most 
likely deem the resulting coefficients as less defensible and informative, the use of dummy vari-
ables in this paper should ameliorate these effects. 
One novel aspect of the proposed research is the use of profit margins and wholesale 
price, in addition to the retail price of the wine, as the dependent variables in the hedonic regres-
sion equations. A reason that other researchers may have not considered retailer profits or whole-
sale price is that inside information from profit earning companies that is neither publicly availa-
ble nor easily accessible is required. Another unique aspect of this paper is the comparison of 
Wine Advocate ratings to those of Wine Spectator and which has a greater influence, if any, on 








There are numerous characteristics of wine that can be included in the hedonic regression. As 
Oczkowski (1994) points out, “any variable that influences consumer benefit or producer cost is 
a candidate for inclusion in the hedonic price function.” This paper used my own knowledge of 
the wine market as well as previous research to determine which characteristics of wine were in-
cluded or excluded. For example, technical attributes, as Oczkowski (1994) mentions, are not 
expected to be of major concern to consumers because this information is neither widely accessi-
ble nor significant in determining price. Other potentially important variables, such as label ap-
peal, production size, and reputation were omitted from these regressions due to either time con-
straints or because quantifying the information was too subjective.  
Issues with Data Collection and Organization 
 
It is best to begin by defining the pricing terminology used throughout the remainder of the pa-
per. Wholesale price is defined as the price the distributor charged the retailer for a case of wine. 
The retail price is the price the retailer charges the end consumer per bottle. The per-bottle retail-
er profit is determined by subtracting the quotient of wholesale price and pack (bottle per case) 
from the retail price. 
For the wines included in the data set, the scores of each individual bottle of wine were 
collected from Wine Advocate and Wine Spectator. During this process, several issues emerged. 
For example, most 2011 vintage ratings had not yet been released when the data was being col-
lected, thus reducing the number of observations drastically. 2010 vintages could not be substi-
tuted for the 2011 vintages because the wholesaler was no longer selling the 2010 vintages and 
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therefore prices weren’t available. In addition, ratings were obviously different between vintages, 
and in most cases, restaurants no longer sold the 2010 vintage.  
In addition to newer vintages not being rated, non-vintage wines often times have differ-
ent ratings from year to year. Non-vintage wines are a combination of the most successful vin-
tages, and because one bottle of wine may consist of multiple vintages, they are designated non-
vintage. The same non-vintage wine (i.e. a wine with the same label but different combination of 
vintages) is often released multiple times over several years, but each is rated in the year it is re-
leased. This results in multiple ratings for the same wine. In this case, the bottle with the most 
recent issue date by the expert notes was used. The issue date is the date in which the expert 
notes were posted to the website and show the most recently released non-vintage wine. This 
procedure is accurate because the non-vintage wines included in the data are made for “drink 
youngest available” (J. Mayfield, personal communication, October 23, 2011).  
Of the ratings gathered, certain ratings by Wine Advocate were given in ranges. In order 
to create a single quality measure, the average of the range was used. For example, if a bottle of 
wine was rated (87-88+) the average quality indicator would be 87.5. In the cases where a plus 
sign was used, as in the 88+ mentioned previously, the score of 88 was used. 
While gathering scores, it became apparent that Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate do 
not always rate the same wines. This being so, many observations do not have both ratings avail-
able. As shown later in this paper, this rating effect will be accounted for and the consequences 
of this feature will be addressed in the hedonic regression.  
In addition to issues with ratings, issues of price arose. The firm has several different 
pricing strategies divided into four levels of pricing. Instead of choosing a suggested retail price, 
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like many previous researchers have done, each wine’s actual wholesale price per case was used. 
Although this was a more labor intensive process and decreased the number of observations, this 
allowed the profit to be exactly that earned by the retailer. During this process, some prices 
charged by the wholesaler to the same retailer were different. In this case, the lower price was 
given as a promotion and thus the higher, more consistently charged price was used. Further-
more, many retailers purchase the same case of wine for different prices; in this case, the infor-
mation from the retailer with the most common selling price was used.  
Because researching each characteristic was labor intensive, the resulting number of ob-
servations is small but accurately reflects the price at which the wine was sold and the profit 
earned by the retailer.  
Data 
 
The final data set consisted of 147 observations of wines from 13 different countries, 60 different 
regions, and 108 different varietal categories. In the sample, wholesale prices range from $5.00 
to $179.00 per case, retail prices range from $7.99 to $370.00 per bottle, and profits range from 
$7.51 to $345.33 per bottle. Wine Advocate scores range from 84-94, while Wine Spectator 
scores range from 77-97. The majority of the wines in this study were from France, Italy, Spain, 
and the United States. 
Based on the type of data that was gathered it was determined that many dummy varia-
bles were required, namely, one dummy for each wine characteristic: country, region, varietal, 
color, type, closure, premise, vintage, quality, Wine Advocate, Wine Spectator, or both. In order 
to decrease the number of dummies, which was imperative due to the small data set, certain vari-
etals were combined and regions that were most prevalent in the data set were used. There were a 
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total number of 58 dummy variables employed. The ensuing table is an overview of the final 
characteristics used and their definitions. 
Table 3 – Overview of Characteristics and Dummy Variables 
Pack 6 or 12 bottles per case 
Size 375, 750 or 1500mL 
Wholesale Price The exact price the retailer paid the distributor for the case of wine 
Retail Price 
The exact price for a bottle of wine based on the retailers menu. In one in-
stance, there was only a per glass price, in which case, the bottle price was 
calculated by multiplying the glass price by 5 to get the bottle price. This 
procedure was used because a 750mL bottle of wine will usually pour about 
5 glasses of wine. 
Profit 
Calculated by subtracting the quotient of wholesale price and pack (bottle per 
case) from the retail price. This is a per bottle profit. 
Quality 
Wine Advocate score if only scored by Wine Advocate, Wine spectator score 
if only scored by Wine Spectator and an average of the Wine Advocate and 
Wine Spectator scores if scored by both.  
Wine Advocate 1 if rated by Wine Advocate only, 0 if not 
Wine Spectator 1 if rated by Wine Spectator only, 0 if not 
Both 1 if rated by Wine Advocate and Wine spectator, 0 if not 
Country 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Chile, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Spain, USA 
Varietal 
Cabernet Franc, Cabernet Sauvignon, Meritage, Rhone Blend, Chardonnay, 
Dolcetto, Garnacha, Gewurztraminer, Malbec, Merlot, Nebbiolo, Pinot Noir, 
Riesling, Sangiovese, Sauvignon Blanc, Shiraz, Tempranillo, Zinfandel 
Region 
Alsace, Beaujolais, Bordeaux, Burgundy, Chablis, Champagne, La Rioja, 
Languedoc, Loire, Napa Valley, Piedmont, Rhone, Sonoma Valley, South 
Australia, Tuscany 
Color Red, Rose, White 
Type Still, Sparkling, Dessert 
Closure Screw, Cork 
Premise On, Off 







The choice of functional form for this data set is limited, given the use of dummy explanatory 
variables. One method to be employed by this paper naturally consists of the linear model in or-
der to get a general understanding of the variable effects. But because the relationship between 
dependent variables and independent variables might not be linear, in that the effect on price or 
profit margins due to a marginal change in a particular characteristic is not constant for all levels 
of that characteristic, other models will also be used. To illustrate, an additional point added to 
an expert wine score is not expected to have the same effect for a wine with a grade of 70 as for a 
wine with a grade of 90. The dependent variables will be wholesale price, retail price, and prof-
its, whereas the independent variables will be various wine characteristics that are hypothesized 
to affect price, including expert wine ratings. 
Hedonic Regressions 
 
Before running the regressions, a decision of base characteristics had to be made for the dummy 
categories. The base characteristics of a classic bottle of wine were chosen; France, Cabernet 
Sauvignon, Bordeaux, red, still, cork, on-premise, and 2010. These variables were excluded from 
all regressions.  
 The initial linear regressions tested Wine Advocate and Wine Spectator scores separately, 
which resulted in a collinearity issue. To determine which variables were collinear, a correlation 
analysis on all of the characteristics, including the dependent and independent variables was 
done. The analysis did not indicate any pair-wise perfect collinearity. Because of the limited 
number of observations with Wine Spectator and Wine Advocate Scores, the full data set was 
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employed by creating a quality variable, as defined in Table 3. This decision was made because 
dividing the data set between Wine Advocate and Wine Spectator decreased the number of obser-
vations per regression drastically and considering the data set is already small, using an even 
smaller data set with the number of dummy variables wasn’t returning a good analysis. With a 
single “quality” variable, each observation was assigned a rating and a single regression was cal-
culated with the full set of observations from the data set. Dummies were also created for “Wine 
Advocate,” “Wine Spectator,” and “both” to designate which was being used as described in Ta-
ble 3. Wine Advocate was chosen as the base characteristic from this set of variables, and was 
therefore removed from all regressions. This allowed for two regressions as opposed to four. The 
new regressions were: 
(i) profit as the dependent variable regressed on all characteristics and quality 
(ii) and retail price as the dependent variable regressed on all characteristics and quality 
It turned out that dolcetto was an exact linear combination of two or more other variables within 
the data set, and so was eliminated from all the regressions.  
Only retail price was used as a dependent variable because retail price and profit had a 
correlation of .9985 with a probability of 1. A multi-variable F-test was conducted on all the re-
tail price coefficients with p-values greater than 0.6 for a total of 24 variables. The computed F-
statistic was 0.19 with a p-value of 1.0. Hence, the regression was re-estimated excluding these 
variables.  
In addition to running a linear regression model, a log-linear regression was also estimat-
ed, where the logarithm of the dependent variable was taken and regressed on all the linear inde-
pendent variables. A multi-variable F-test on the coefficients with a p-value above 0.6 resulted in 
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an F-statistic of 0.10 with a p-value of 1.0. As above, the model was re-estimated excluding the 
19 variables. A linear-quadratic, linear-log, and log-log model were also estimated in the same 
fashion. In the linear-quadratic model, all dependent and independent variables remained linear, 
but an additional variable, namely quality squared, was added to the regression. The linear-log 
model regressed a linear dependent variable on the logarithm of quality in addition to all other 
variables, which remained linear. In the log-log model, the logarithm of the dependent variable 
was regressed on the logarithm of quality in addition to the dummy variables. It is important to 
note that the dummies are always represented as linear in all regressions and remained un-
changed throughout and only the dependent variables and/or quality were transformed.  
Table 4 shows the regression statistics for all five regressions, before the variables whose 
















Table 4 – Hedonic Regression Analysis on Retail Price 
 Linear Before Linear After Linear-Log  Before Linear-Log After 
Number of  
   Observations 
147 147 147 147 
Variables 58 34 58 34 
F-Statistic 3.12 6.28 3.10 6.30 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.6730 0.6559 0.6712 0.6567 
 0.4575 0.5514 0.4544 0.5525 
Root MSE 40.749 37.055 40.866 37.012 
 
 Linear-Quadratic Before Linear-Quadratic After 
Number of  
   Observations 
147 147 
Variables 59 36 
F-Statistic 3.35 6.54 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
  0.6945 0.6815 
 0.4873 0.5773 
Root MSE 39.617 35.972 
 
 Log-Linear Before Log-Linear After Log-Log  Before Log-Log After 
Number of  
   Observations 
147 147 147 147 
Variables 58 39 58 39 
F-Statistic 5.85 10.30 5.80 10.21 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.7940 0.7896 0.7926 0.7882 
 0.6582 0.7129 0.6558 0.7110 




 After observing the quality effect on retail price, a curiosity developed regarding the ef-
fect quality may have on the wholesale price the retailers paid. A linear regression was estimated 
using this as a dependent variable as well. As before, a multi-variable F-test was conducted on all 
of the variables with a p-value larger than 0.6. The computed F-statistic was 0.29 with a p-value 
of 0.9994. The model was re-estimated excluding these 23 variables. The same procedure was 
followed for the log-linear, linear-quadratic, linear-log, and log-log regressions as well. Table 5 
shows the regression statistics for all regressions, before the variables whose coefficients were 




















Table 5 – Hedonic Regression Analysis on Wholesale Price 
 Linear Before Linear After Log-Liner Before Log-Linear After 
Number of  
   Observations 
147 147 147 147 
Variables 58 35 58 37 
F-Statistic 3.35 6.29 5.55 10.31 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.6883 0.6649 0.7853 0.7777 
 0.4829 0.5592 0.6439 0.7022 
Root MSE 20.112 18.571 0.4773 0.43644 
 
 Linear-Quadratic Before Linear-Quadratic After 
Number of  
   Observations 
147 147 
Variables 59 35 
F-Statistic 3.50 6.89 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
  0.7036 0.6848 
 0.5026 0.5854 
Root MSE 19.727 18.011 
 
 Linear-Log Before Linear-Log After Log-Log Before Log-Log After 
Number of  
   Observations 
147 147 147 147 
Variables 58 36 58 37 
F-Statistic 3.32 6.12 5.51 10.23 
P-value 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
  0.6866 0.6670 0.7840 0.7764 
 0.4801 0.5580 0.6416 0.7005 




It is important to remember that the linear model is making an implicit assumption, 
namely, that quality affects the retail or wholesale price in a linear manner. Results from the lin-
ear-quadratic regression provide evidence to the contrary as the coefficient on the quality 
squared variable is significant with a p-value of 0.000. Due to this finding and the superior 
measures of fit, the linear-quadratic model dominates the linear regression. For the same reasons, 
the linear-quadratic model dominates the linear-log model, and the linear model marginally dom-





Hedonic Regression on Retail Price  
 
The correlation between the dependent variables profit and retail price was .9985, and therefore 
are affected by each wine characteristic in a very similar manner. Results for the linear regres-
sion model with retail price as the dependent variable are interpreted in comparison to the base 
characteristics (France, Cabernet Sauvignon, Bordeaux, red, still, cork, on-premise, 2010 and 
with a Wine Advocate score). Only the effects of the variables whose coefficients had a p-value 
of 0.05 or less are discussed in what follows.  
The Wine Spectator and both dummy coefficients were not significantly different from 
zero at the 0.05 level of confidence, indicating that a score given by Wine Advocate or Wine 
Spectator, or the average score when rated by both, do not have significantly different effects on 
the retail price. The quality variable indicated that for every quality point increase, retail price is 
estimated to rise by $7.14, on average. Off-premise wines are predicted to be priced $15.22 low-
er than an identical wine consumed on-premise. A wine from Spain is estimated to be priced 
$36.24, on average, lower than an otherwise identical wine from France. Relative to varietal, a 
nebbiolo wine will be priced, on average, $82.12 higher than a Cabernet Sauvignon. A wine 
from Burgundy will, on average, receive a price $88.01 higher than a wine from Bordeaux. Fi-
nally, a wine from the 2006 vintage will on average sell for $13.64 more than a 2010 vintage. 
These results are parallel with those when profit was used as the dependent variable and are only 
applicable to the observations in the data set. 
The estimated marginal effect of quality in the linear-quadratic model was evaluated us-












                       (1) 
Where Q  is the quality rating, ˆQ  is the estimated coefficient on Q , and 2
ˆ
Q
  is the esti- 
mated coefficient on 
2Q . The expected change in retail price given a quality score of 85 is nega-
tive $0.80; for a quality score of 90, price is predicted to increase by $8.79; while for a quality 
score of 95 price is predicted to increase by $18.38.  
When evaluating the log-linear model, the coefficients show the expected change in the 
logarithm of the dependent variable given a change in the independent characteristics, but this 
paper is not interested in the logarithm of the dependent variable. Instead this paper wants to 
predict the expected change in the non-logarithmic dependent variable. The following formula 















  (2) 
For more information on this formula and its derivation, please refer to Hill et al. (2011) or Cam-
eron et al. (2009) which provide great explanations. 
This equation was also evaluated using quality scores of 85, 90, and 95. The expected in-
crease in retail price given a marginal change in quality from 85 is $3.24. For a marginal change 
from a quality score of 90, price is predicted to increase by $5.49, which from 95 price is pre-
dicted to increase by $9.30. Thus for the log-linear model, the predicted marginal effect of quali-
ty on price is positive and increases with an increase in quality, i.e. predicted price is an increas-
ing function of quality at an increasing rate. The qualitative nature of quality on price is thus the 
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same as that in the linear-quadratic regression model. The remaining models are summarized in 
the Appendix.  
Hedonic Regression on Wholesale Price 
 
Although retail price and profit are highly correlated, the same effect was not true for wholesale 
price. Table 6 shows the correlation analysis of the three variables.  
Table 6 – Correlation of Dependent Variables 
 Wholesale Price Retail Price Profit 
Wholesale Price 1.0000   
Retail Price 0.9078 1.0000  
Profit 0.8889 0.9985 1.0000 
 
Results for the linear regression model with wholesale price as the dependent variable are 
interpreted in comparison to the base characteristics. Only the effects of the variables whose co-
efficients had a p-value of 0.05 or less are discussed in what follows. 
The quality variable indicated that for every point increase, wholesale price is estimated 
to rise by $4.29, on average. A wine from Spain is estimated to be priced lower than an other-
wise identical wine from France. The nebbiolo varietal and region of burgundy are predicted to 
be sold at a premium price, which is similar to the findings in the previous regression. Additional 
results for wholesale price indicate that white wines and Rhone blends on average have a lower 
price than red and Cabernet Sauvignon wines respectively. Relative to the type of establishment, 
a wine sold to an off-premise location will be priced, on average, $8.56 higher than an on-
premise location. Finally, 2004 and 2005 vintages will, on average, sell at a premium compared 
to the 2010 vintage 
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The linear-quadratic model was evaluated following the same procedure as before. The 
expected change in wholesale price given an incremental increase in quality from 85 was $0.42. 
Similarly, a marginal increase in quality from 90 yielded a predicted price increase of $4.99, and 
given a quality score of 95, price was predicted to increase by $9.56.  
The log-linear model was also evaluated following the same procedure. The expected 
change in retail price given a marginal change in quality from 85 resulted in a $3.24 increase in 
price; a marginal increase in quality from 90 resulted in a $5.49 increase in price and an incre-
mental increase in quality from 95 resulted in a $9.30 increase in predicted price. The remaining 






The linear-quadratic model is a better representation of the data and allows for a more accurate 
interpretation of the quality variable coefficients. Wine Advocate and Wine Spectator were found 
not to differ significantly in their influence on price, proving the mere existence of a rating is 
more important than which periodical issued it, when considering those two ranking systems.  
The effect expert ratings have on wholesale price, retail price, and retailer profits are pos-
itive. The dollar values resulting from an incremental quality increase have more influence on 
the predicted price/profit of the wine the higher the rating becomes. This implies that if expert 
ratings increase, the distributor is expected to charge higher prices to retailers and the retailer is 
expected to charge higher prices to consumers. These resulting dollar values are higher for the 
predicted retail price than for the predicted wholesale price in all models.  
Consumers can use this information for their purchasing decisions. Many blind taste tests 
reveal that highly rated wines may not actually taste better to consumers than their lowly rated 
counterparts. In a sample of roughly 6,000 blind tastings, Goldstein et al. (2008) revealed that 
“individuals on average enjoy more expensive wines slightly less.” Therefore, for South Florida 
residents, it may be in their best interest to purchase lower rated wines from on-premise loca-
tions. If those prices are still too steep for consumers, their best interest lies, as one would as-
sume, with the better value of purchasing wine at off-premise locations. 
Implications for the retailer mainly evolve around obtaining highly rated wines to in-
crease their profits per bottle. Although the prudent customer may not submit to this pricing 
strategy, research shows there are consumers who will. As Lecocq and Visser (2006) point out, 
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for some consumers, “higher wine prices act as a stimulant rather than as a deterrent,” and that 
“part of the pleasure is apparently to know that a wine is famous and very expensive.”  
The information retrieved from the wholesaler is not as clear. Although the data suggests 
that the wholesaler increases their price when quality increases, this may not be true. The whole-
saler may be reacting to higher prices from the producer causing them to adjust their prices ac-
cordingly, without taking into consideration expert ratings. In order to fully understand the strat-
egy behind the wholesaler, information from the producer is needed. This would make an inter-
esting future study. 
Moreover, these are not universal implications, but rather findings associated with a sin-
gle company and their distribution of retailers. Although the research is limited to South Florida 
and the distribution of stores in this study, it does reveal important information about pricing de-
terminants at different distribution levels. It would be interesting to know whether the findings of 




APPENDIX: LINEAR-LOG AND LOG-LOG RESULTS 
 





























Retail Price 9.303774 
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